

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CONCEPT OF INDOCTRINATION

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Concept of Indoctrination" submitted by James Charles Lang in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

In this thesis I examine the positions of several contemporary analytical philosophers on the subject of the concept of indoctrination. I include: John Wilson, R.M. Hare, R.F. Atkinson, T.F. Green, J.P. White, A.G.N. Flew, Willis Moore, Brian S. Crittenden, I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods, and A. Snook. I attempt to show the inadequacies of the positions taken by these philosophers, and, finally, I present my own analysis of the concept of indoctrination based on what can be called the 'quorum feature of language' as explicated by Wittgenstein, Hospers and Alston.

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By education most have been misled
So they believe, because they were so bred.
The priest continues what the nurse began,
And thus the child imposes on the man.

- Dryden

INTRODUCTION

A substantial number of articles have appeared since 1964 on the topic of indoctrination. The philosophers who have analyzed the concept of indoctrination have, significantly, been unable to arrive at a consensus of opinion about what criteria adequately delineate indoctrination from other related activities, and especially, from teaching.

It is because of the lack of agreement among the contributing philosophers, and the volume of material which they have produced, that I feel a survey of what has been expounded in recent debates be undertaken. Through the presentation of the most relevant discussions of indoctrination since the subject became of renewed interest in the mid-1960's, and by critical examination of these discussions, I hope to give a concise summary of where the arguments have led us thus far, and to suggest possible directions which could be taken from here.

In spite of the admitted desire of some of the authors to provide conclusive analyses of indoctrination, it is not at all clear that all the controversies raised in philosophical discussions to date have been laid to rest. In fact, it would seem that each author succeeded in presenting us with even more problems than his predecessor.

On the whole I will deal with the articles in chronological order, with the exception of T.F. Green's work, which I included out of the chronological context because

his essay is more to the purpose earlier in the thesis.

Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach, edited by T.H.B. Hollins, was published in 1964. Among the contributors to this collection of philosophical essays were John Wilson, and R.M. Hare. It was Wilson's article "Education and Indoctrination" which effectively re-opened the discussion of indoctrination in philosophical circles, and began the series of papers which were written on the topic by other educational philosophers and which continues to the present day. R.M. Hare offers a critical response to Wilson in "Adolescents into Adults", which follows directly in the same publication.

R.F. Atkinson produced an article entitled "Instruction and Indoctrination", as a contributing author in R.D. Archambault's Philosophical Analysis and Education, published in 1965. This was followed by a string of essays in Studies in Philosophy and Education, begun in spring, 1966 by A.G.N. Flew's "What is Indoctrination?". The summer issue of the same year saw John Wilson's "Comments on Flew's What is Indoctrination?" and Willis Moore's "Indoctrination as a Normative Concept". Wilson and Moore then became the object of another article by Flew, "What is Indoctrination? Comments on Moore and Wilson", published in spring, 1967.

R.S. Peter's book, The Concept of Education, appeared in 1966. In this anthology of educational perspectives J.P. White contributes his version of "Indoctrination".

Brian S. Crittenden offers an analysis of indoctrination from the educational standpoint in "Teaching, Educating and Indoctrinating", published in Educational Theory, in 1968. 1969 saw Green's "A Topology of the Teaching Concept", in which he deals with indoctrination only as a part of the larger work. He appears along with other contributors in Philosophical Essays on Teaching, edited by Bandman and Guttchen.

I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods co-authored a lengthy treatise called, simply, "Indoctrination". Their work was published in Volume IV of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain: Proceedings of the Annual Conference, in January, 1970. J.P. White presented a reply to Gregory and Woods in the same year.

The latest release on the topic of indoctrination is a weighty work by A. Snook. "The Concept of Indoctrination" was published in Studies in Philosophy and Education, spring, 1970. This article is based on Snook's Ph.D. dissertation presented in 1968 at the University of Illinois.

These then are the authors who will be dealt with in the main body of this thesis. I hope to show in the last chapter of the thesis that there is another possible standpoint from which to view indoctrination, and for this reason I employ largely the criticisms of the authors of each other in the first five chapters, rather than commenting a great deal from my own stance. In this way I hope it will appear that they have been adequately dealt with on their own terms.

CHAPTER I

THE REBIRTH OF THE DISCUSSION

John Wilson's article "Education and Indoctrination" appeared in 1964, and was published in Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach, edited by T.H.B. Hollins. It was not that his work provided a great deal of insight into the problem of defining 'indoctrination' that renders his efforts singularly important. In fact, when criticized by Antony Flew,[1] Wilson began his reply by stating that he had intended his article "more to stimulate a lay audience" than to be "a piece of scholarly philosophical analysis".[2] Wilson's importance is primarily due to the fact that he re-opened the discussion, and raised some of the basic questions about indoctrination.

> One of the concepts which it is most useful to contrast with education is the notion of indoctrination. This is of importance, because we are anxious to establish general principles about how and what we are to teach children, or how we are to wield educational influence in general: and the word 'indoctrination' represents a nebulous but large area of logical terrain from which we feel, vaguely, that we ought to keep well away. 'Indoctrination' represents, to most of us, something pernicious, though we are not quite sure what: an area whose frontiers, if we only knew where they were, we do not want to cross.[3]

Wilson's attempt to find those 'frontiers' leads him first to a brief discussion of the methods of teaching; whether it is the method used in conveying a message which determines the area of indoctrination. It is not surprising that he should be suspicious of methods, as the average per-

son would no doubt call to mind water-torture, and other brain-washing techniques when asked about the concept. Wilson, himself, says that this is to be expected:

> The model cases of indoctrination are obvious: brain-washing people to believe in Communism, teaching Christianity by threat of torture or damnation, forcing people by early training to accept social roles as in Huxley's Brave New World.[4]

However, Wilson recognizes that method alone is not a necessary and sufficient criterion to delineate cases of indoctrination. His reasoning is that in the teaching of children and infants, it is necessary to use methods which appear to be indoctrinatory, because children are incapable of discussion regarding what they ought, and ought not do.[5] It seems that because Wilson believes indoctrination to be intrinsically a bad thing, and that the use of non-rational methods to get children to learn is necessary, and not a bad thing, the use of non-rational methods is not a clear indication of indoctrination. The difference, says Wilson, "is rather a difference of subject matter".[6]

Wilson's claim is that beliefs are what is taught, and that the certainty or uncertainty with which the general public holds these beliefs determines whether or not these beliefs can be indoctrinated. He poses examples of certain and uncertain beliefs:

> Religious, political and moral beliefs are uncertain, in a sense in which mathematics and Latin grammar are not uncertain. And... we object to closing people's minds on certain issues.[7]

And just when do we consider beliefs uncertain? Wilson says

that beliefs are uncertain when any "sane and sensible" person would not necessarily hold them when presented with the relevant facts and arguments.[8] To avoid indoctrination, only rational beliefs must be taught, and "what they must be backed by is evidence".[9] However, this evidence must also be publicly accepted evidence. It is also important to note, says Wilson, that more weight should be given to the putting forward of evidence than to the inculcating of beliefs:

> The concept of indoctrination concerns the truth and evidence of beliefs, and our objection to it is basically thatin the realm of belief we must put truth, evidence and reality first, and other considerations second.[10]

Wilson holds an even more basic reason for objecting to indoctrination. He feels that the closing of minds which results from indoctrination effectively diminishes the human personality, and this must be avoided.

> It is not only that we do not want closed minds on open questions, for the sake of progress merely. It is that we value the human personality, and do not want it to be diminished.[11]

While he believes that beliefs are central to the content of indoctrination, they are not exclusively so. Behaviour can be indoctrinated as well as beliefs;

> Indoctrination begins when the behaviour we teach children is behaviour demanded by ourselves and not by reality at all: when we force on the child a particular interpretation of reality which we may think is good, but which an ancient Greek or a medieval Chinaman or a modern Red Indian would think wicked, absurd or unnecessary.[12]

Wilson claims that he has shown that the test for indoctrination consists in the content of what we teach. Now that

he has clarified the term, he goes on to provide a guide-line one might follow in order to avoid indoctrinating. The three major rules, paraphrased, are as follows:

> (1) Realize how much education is dominated by factors such as opinion, parental pressure, etc., and try to steer the rational course.
>
> (2) Appreciate the general ways in which society is irrational and hence repressive, so that you can achieve greater objectivity.
>
> (3) Be realistic about the methods of changing society.[13]

By being realistic and rational teachers can avoid indoctrinating, although Wilson feels that most of the teaching today is intodctrinatory or irrelevant. In closing, he reiterates this point: "An ounce of reality is worth many tons of fantasy and confusion."[14]

That Wilson should come under hard criticism from other analytic philosophers is not surprising when one considers the weakness of several of his claims. Why should he so readily assume that because we teach children without giving sufficient evidence for what we present to them that we are not indoctrinating them since this is a necessary part of their education? Merely to say that indoctrination is a bad thing, and that our teaching of children is not a bad thing does not clarify the issue a great deal. Is it not possible that indoctrination is not always a bad practise? And, is it not also possible that teaching children

without giving sufficient evidence of what we teach is not a good practise? Wilson's claim for content differentiation leaves many unanswered questions as well: Who is to decide what 'right' content consists of? What constitutes a "sane and sensible" person? How much evidence is 'sufficient'?

R.M. Hare was aware of these problems, and others, in Wilson's paper. Hare's essay "Adolescents into Adults", which appears in Aims in Education along with Wilson, is an attempt to answer the above questions, and to present a more elaborate delineation of the concept of indoctrination.

Hare begins by agreeing with Wilson that indoctrination is a bad thing. This is, however, approximately the sum total of their agreement. He sympathizes with Wilson's motives, however:

> It is of the highest importance to safeguard Mr. Wilson's liberal views against [attacks by propagandists]; for otherwise advocates of the closed mind and the closed society may find it easier to enlist support of moderates against Mr. Wilson; and that would be a pity.[15]

Hare raises the issue as to who are to count as sane and sensible people. These people would be the final recourse in deciding upon the certainty or uncertainty of beliefs. Surely, claims Hare, those who teach Catholic doctrine would want to maintain that they are sane and sensible people, and yet they will deny that the beliefs they teach are in any way uncertain.[16] Furthermore, says Hare,

to claim that there is a correct doctrine which could not be indoctrinated is to assume that the teacher is the one who knows what it is, even if such a doctrine were conceivable. Wilson falls into the trap of considering only content as a possible delineating factor of indoctrination because he does not consider a third possibility, beyond method, and beyond content; the possibility of aim, or, intention, says Hare.

Hare rejects method as a useful consideration on the grounds that some methods of indoctrination do not differ fundamentally from some methods of legitimate teaching. It is impossible to distinguish teaching from indoctrination in terms of methodology alone. He does not deny that non-rational methods of teaching are employed in the education of very small children. However, by having the intention that he hopes that the children will one day be able to decide by their own reasoning, Hare claims that temporary non-rational methods may be validly used. While the external trappings of indoctrination are exhibited, in his case he is not indoctrinating. He claims that if he had intended that his children hold these beliefs indefinitely and non-rationally, he would have been indoctrinating.

> So, though on occasion I may use the very same methods of teaching as the German who wrote this rhyme;[17] and though my teaching may have exactly the same content ...he is indoctrinating and I am not, because he wants the child always to go on taking its morality from its elders, even after they are dead, whereas I want the child as soon as possible to learn to think morally for itself.[18]

The intention of the indoctrinator, then, according to Hare, is not only to have the child hold beliefs non-rationally, but that he hold these same beliefs indefinitely. The 'closing of minds' in Wilson becomes the 'inhibiting of growth' in Hare:

> ...indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the growth in our children of the capacity to think for themselves about moral questions.[19]

Content is not entirely unaffected by all this, says Hare. The difference in aim will result in a different in content.[20] Because the indoctrinator will be limiting the discussion of a subject, the subject itself will be changed. That one has to teach moral principles is obvious, says Hare, but it must inevitably be left to the child to decide whether or not he wants to retain these principles. Non-rationality is primarily necessary, says Hare, to get a child to recognize universalizable moral principles. He says he has two non-rational influences in mind; environment and example.[21] This means that the example of elders will be based upon their acceptance of universalizable moral principles, and as such, the child will be exposed to these principles as well, without rational explanation, in every case. When he gets old enough, he will be able to decide for himself as to whether or not he wishes to hold the principles held by his elders. Hare looks forward to the time when the child will be sufficiently autonomous to make his own decisions. When this happens the role of the educator changes, without regret:

> At the end of it all, the educator will insensibly stop being an educator, and find that he is talking to an equal, to an educated man like himself - a man who may disagree with everything he has ever said; and, unlike the indoctrinator, he will be pleased. So, when this happens, you can tell from the expression on his face which he is.[22]

Hare's treatment of the topic becomes almost whimsical at the end of his discussion, as seen above. Surely he is not serious that we have to wait until every child is fully grown to discover whether or not he was indoctrinated in his youth. Furthermore, if the child will eventually become critical in either case, why should indoctrination be feared?

But there are many other problems associated with the insistence that indoctrination can necessarily and sufficiently be defined by virtue of the aim or intention of the person indoctrinating. For example, must the indoctrinator be successful, given his intention? As well, surely the indoctrinator must <u>do</u> something significantly different from what the teacher does, and if this is the case, then it is possible that a teacher could be doing the same things as an indoctrinator without having the intention to indoctrinate. Finally, just how is one to determine the intention of an indoctrinator? Does Hare actually believe that in every instance the indoctrinator will admit his intention to indoctrinate?

Clearly the discussion could not end here. But before going on with this type of argumentation it could be useful to look at some parallel discussions of indoctrination which appeared only shortly after <u>Aims in Education: The Philosophic</u>

Approach was published. Direct criticisms of Hare and Wilson were indeed forthcoming from Antony Flew and others, and their form of treatment is a continuous running battle in Studies in Philosophy and Education, from 1966 to the present day. However, because their articles make mention of Atkinson, Moore, Green and White, it is necessary to look at these very men first.

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[20] Ibid., p. 54.

[21] Ibid., p. 64.

[22] Ibid., p. 70.

CHAPTER II

PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS AND ARGUMENTS

R.F. Atkinson's article "Instruction and Indoctrination" was published in 1965 in Philosophical Analysis and Education, edited by R.D. Archambault.[1] Atkinson's purpose is somewhat different from Wilson, Hare and others. He wants to draw a distinction between instruction and indoctrination; this as opposed to education and indoctrination - however light the distinction between instruction and education may be - for the purpose of showing the problems related to instruction about morals as opposed to instruction in morals. The latter, he feels is highly suspect.[2]

One of the ways of differentiating instruction from indoctrination, claims Atkinson, is that instruction aims at teaching how more than teaching that. Instruction, says Atkinson,

> is essentially a rational process, both at the giving and, in so far as it is successful, at the receiving end. It involves, for instance, providing adequate support, by way of proofs, reasons, evidence, whatever may be appropriate to the field in question, for the conclusions it is sought to impart. No higher degree of conviction is sought than is warranted by the nature of the support available... and in so far as it succeeds, instruction puts its subject in the way of making progress in the field by his own efforts... Indoctrination on the other hand, need not. It is subject to no such restrictions. Conviction or assent is all that is sought, and any teaching procedure is acceptable provided only that it is, or is thought to be effective in achieving this end.... If knowledge consists in justified (full) conviction, then the object and result of instruction may be knowledge; whereas of the man who is indoctrinated merely, although what

> he believes may be true and capable of justification, it will not be possible to say that he knows it.[3]

It is not surprising that Atkinson should be gravitating toward the 'content' approach to distinguishing indoctrination from instruction. He, of course, will eventually try to show that moral content is very prone to indoctrination. However, there is a hint in his argument that intention is involved. He says that "conviction or assent is all that is sought".[4] Does this imply that the indoctrinator must consciously 'seek' or 'intend' that this type of conviction be attained? As well, there is apparently some weight given to method. The use or non-use of rational methods appears to be more an issue of method than of content. But Atkinson claims that he is not prescribing certain methods of instruction over others:

> I am not maintaining that teaching should or can consist entirely in instruction and training as I have described them. Even where the ultimate aims are knowledge and intelligent practice, it seems inevitable that some recourse will have to be had to non-rational teaching methods, that it will sometimes be necessary to try to impart information and techniques beyond the recipients' understanding... Nor, moreover, can anyone have a full grasp of all the information, techniques, etc., that he puts to use. We have all taken a vast amount on trust, and must continue to do so.[5]

Atkinson is not asking for a body of truths that would everywhere and always be acceptable; but he is asking for "criteria for determining what is and is not acceptable."[6] Instruction, then, would have to have a due regard for the criteria of the field in question. "Accordingly, the more fugitive the criteria may be in a particular field, the

harder will it be to distinguish instruction and indoctrination."[7] This will, of course, be of special interest with regard to moral instruction where the criteria would indeed be 'fugitive', but for the present Atkinson is quite content that "so long as the instruction-indoctrination distinction can be drawn within a field, we have, as it were, ready-made, a basis for evaluating and regulating the non-rational teaching methods we may be obliged to use..."[8]

While the distinction drawn apparently relies on the method of instruction, Atkinson's present concern is with the "question whether there is a possible content for moral instruction".[9] The theory would be that if there is a content for moral instruction, then there would have to be a guide to the teaching of it, and this would make possible the distinction between moral instruction and indoctrination.

Certainly, claims Atkinson, in teaching morals one is not dealing with information in the ordinary sense. What could moral information be? "If there are criteria of truth, cogency, (and) correctness, in the field", then, says Atkinson, there could be moral teaching.[10] Atkinson sets out to find these moral criteria. He considers the thoughts of Hume, Hare, Stevenson and Peters with little ultimate satisfaction. Atkinson finds that none of the above can provide any kind of workable criterion for the teaching of morals. He concludes his work with a plea for more thought to be given to this important area of discussion:

I suppose it is feared that any serious consideration

> of morality might reopen the denominational quarrels of the past. Hence the constant lip-service to platitudinous ideals... the air of complete unreality that infects discussions of morality.... I think moral philosophy may in recent years have been unduly preoccupied with questions of ultimate justification, and that the more recent reaction, change of emphasis, is to be welcomed.[11]

That Atkinson could not find his moral criteria is of little consequence in terms of the larger problem of indoctrination. The guide which he sets up as beneficial for the teaching of other subjects is of primary importance.

The claim for adequate reasoning is not new. Hare talks of giving sufficient evidence and, although his primary claim is for intention, he does mention that the indoctrinator would be less interested in prolonging discussion of the subject matter.[12] The problem with Atkinson's approach is brought out by Atkinson himself. He says that non-rational methods are sometimes necessary, and with regard to content, that no one can have a full grasp "of all the information, techniques, etc., that he puts to use."[13] Is it ever possible to draw useful distinctions between the correct amount of information one has at his disposal and the incorrect amount which would lead to indoctrination? It may well not be possible for anyone to have a clear guide to adequate reasoning in any area of discourse. That there would be difficulty in the area of morals is not surprising considering the qualifications necessary to make the guideline theory workable in the more empirical branches of study. One must ask if Atkinson really provides much of a service

in his attempt to clarify the boundaries of indoctrination. One might summarize him by admonishing, "Always give an acceptable amount of evidence for what you teach, except when you are dealing with young children, or when you simply don't have all the information, in which case you will be, unavoidably, indoctrinating." It is all much too vague.

T.F. Green, in an article entitled "A Topology of the Teaching Concept",[14] slips into a discussion of indoctrination while discussing beliefs and how to distinguish between beliefs and how we hold them. His argument is to follow the 'sufficient evidence' mode, somewhat as Atkinson's does;

> When beliefs are held without regard to evidence or contrary to evidence, or apart from good reasons or the canons for testing reasons and evidence, then we may say they are held non-evidentially.... This contrast between holding beliefs evidentially and non-evidentially corresponds closely to a fundamental point on the teaching continuum. It has to do with a conventional contrast between teaching and indoctrinating.[15]

Green goes on to say that the content of beliefs adds nothing to the distinction. It is possible, he says, to indoctrinate someone into the truth. The only problem will be the nature of how they hold the belief. It will not be said that they know the belief; they only know that it is a correct belief.[16] The distinction is that while they can be said to hold certain true beliefs, they are not capable of giving sound evidence in support of these beliefs. That the beliefs can only be known to be correct beliefs says Green, "is one of the features of beliefs held as a consequence of indoctrination."[17]

Green wishes to show that the contrast between teaching and indoctrination "cuts more deeply" than this alone. He points out that the restriction of an argument or discussion to only certain fixed areas, without the possibility of going beyond those areas, is to create an indoctrinatory situation;

> Both teaching and indoctrination may involve debate, questions, discussion and argument. Both appear to involve instruction, and, in that respect, there is a striking resemblance between them. But there is also a great difference. In indoctrinating, the conversation of instruction is employed only in order that fairly specific and predetermined beliefs may be set... the intent of indoctrination is to lead people to hold beliefs as though they were arrived at by inquiry, and yet to hold them independently of any subsequent inquiry and therefore secure against the threat of change by the later introduction of conflicting reasons or conflicting evidence.[18]

The purpose in raising questions, then, according to Green, is not to arrive at conclusions, but rather to persuade. Green would consider rote learning an example of indoctrination. His particular example is as follows: Adams is taught through explanations, arguments, and the statements of authorities, that Columbus discovered America. This is teaching. Barnes, on the other hand, is required to respond 'Columbus' to the question 'Who discovered America?' each and every time the question is asked. Barnes is rewarded for the correct answer and suitably punished for the incorrect answer. Because in Barnes' case it is not necessary to assert that Columbus actually did discover America, we cannot say that Barnes was taught that Columbus discovered America. Barnes knows how to respond; Adams knows that

Columbus discovered America.[19]

The evidential style of belief, posits Green, is tied to the process of instruction, or something similar to instruction, while the non-evidential style of belief is not tied to the process by which beliefs are acquired. He states formally the nature of a non-evidentially held belief:

> A belief is held non-evidentially when it is held quite apart from any reasons, evidence or canons for testing reasons and evidence; and, therefore, the process by which the belief comes to be held is logically a matter of no consequence.[20]

An evidentially held belief is always held in relation to the grounds or evidence for holding it. This does not imply, says Green, that instruction always must succeed. A student may not believe that Columbus was the discoverer of the American continent, but he will give reasons for not believing, and this is the difference. Green goes on to say that doctrine is not the only content that can be indoctrinated.

> Indeed, when indoctrination is seen to involve a certain style of knowing or believing, we can discover the possibility of indoctrination in nearly every area of human knowledge and not simply in those having to do with what we would more commonly call 'matters of doctrine'.[21]

How does one recognize concrete cases of indoctrination? Green, not surprisingly, gives an almost circular answer;

> A person who is indoctrinated can sometimes give reasons and evidence for his beliefs, because as a practical matter, reasons and evidence were necessary in the process of establishing his beliefs. The difference, however, is betrayed in his <u>use</u> of reasons

> and evidence. He will use argument, criticism, evidence, and so forth, not as an instrument of inquiry, but as an instrument establishing what he already believes. He will display a marked incapacity to seriously consider conflicting evidence or entertain contrary reasons... such a person will hold his beliefs as matters of ideology [which] requires reason as a weapon. This is not required for the defense of a belief held evidentially.[22]

Green then considers how one might test himself to see whether he has been indoctrinated or not. To do this, he says, you must test the evidentiality of your own beliefs and this requires "rare courage and honesty". If a person says his beliefs are indoctrinated, this is a good reason for saying that they are <u>not</u> indoctrinated. Indoctrination is only successful when people think they hold their beliefs evidentially when, in fact, they don't. Green concludes, "Indoctrination then is the intentional propagation of an illusion."[23]

Because Green's concern is with instruction, he relies heavily on method to distinguish indoctrination from instruction. The guide to the distinction is relatively simple; sound, sufficient reasoning accompanies evidentially held beliefs, and this is instruction. Unsound, insufficient reasoning, if in fact there is any reasoning, accompanies non-evidentially held beliefs, and this typifies indoctrination. There are a few problems with this view as other authors will take pains to point out. Among them are these questions which Green's essay evokes: Must the teacher <u>aim</u> to indoctrinate, or is it possible that the teacher is simply ignorant of the facts and because of this the students

come to hold their beliefs with insufficient evidence?[24] How would one set out to distinguish between a teacher who is presenting evidence merely to establish his point and one who is presenting evidence in order to arrive at the truth? As well, is one always indoctrinating when one attempts to prove a point? Regarding the issue Green raises about sufficient evidence, the question remains; how much evidence is sufficient? This becomes a problem with the teaching of young children. Surely parents are not required to give volumes of reasons and evidence when teaching their child that the stove is hot. Perhaps the giving of evidence is simply not sufficient in every case to warrant the title of indoctrination, regardless of how much evidence is in question.

The difficulties with Green's analysis are basically those above. One can easily conceive of a case where the indoctrinator provides a great deal of reasons and evidence for the subject being taught and who believes that what he is doing is arriving at the truth as he perceives it. We could still label him an indoctrinator for other reasons. Perhaps what he believes to be the truth is in fact a dubious doctrine. Surely this is the case with the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools. As well, a teacher in a given situation may provide very little evidence for what he is teaching, but, either because the content is not generally acceptable to most people, or because the content is trivial, we may not want to call him an indoctrinator.

It seems that the border between instruction and indoctrination is not nearly so clear as Green would have us believe.

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[9] Ibid., p. 175.

[10] Ibid., p. 176.

[11] Ibid., p. 182.

[12] Hare, R.M., "Adolescents into Adults", op. cit., p. 54.

[13] Atkinson, R.F., "Instruction and Indoctrination", op. cit., p. 173.

[14] Green, T.F., "A Topology of the Teaching Concept" in B. Bandman and R.S. Guttchen (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Teaching (Philadelphia, New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1969), pp. 34-65.

[15] Ibid., p. 47.

[16] Ibid., p. 47.

[17] Ibid., p. 48.

[18] Ibid., p. 48.

[19] Ibid., p. 49.

[20] Ibid., p. 49.

[21] Ibid., p. 51.

[22] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[23] Ibid., p. 52.

[24] Ibid., p. 39.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISMS AND REBUTTALS

Flew's article, 'What is Indoctrination?' appeared in the spring, 1966, issue of Studies in Philosophy and Education. His paper is "primarily concerned with the concept of indoctrination and with what can and cannot be done through the analysis of this idea."[1] He begins his treatment by closely examining the essays by Hare and Wilson.

Flew first wants to point out "that the concept of indoctrination refers to the implanting of doctrines",[2] something which is omitted in Hare's work. Flew assumes that the etymology of the word suggests that this is the proper way to think of indoctrination, and that this type of distinction provides a useful limitation of content. As has been shown, not every philosopher would agree with Flew on this point. This would discount the possibility that multiplication tables could be indoctrinated. As well, even if one were attempting to learn French by using sleep-training, one would not want to label this activity as indoctrinatory, according to Flew. Flew re-emphasizes his point on doctrine:

> Before we can speak of indoctrination we have to be dealing with the imparting of beliefs, whether true or false, which either themselves are, or at least which are closely connected with others which uneqivocally are, of that subsort, whatever it may be, which can correctly be described as doctrinal.[3]

Flew intends, at least in part, to show that there must be a distinction between inadequate teaching and indoctrination.

Even if the teacher is presenting incorrect French, she is not necessarily indoctrinating. In order for this to constitute indoctrination a necessary, but not sufficient, condition would be that it be "tied up with something wider and more ideological".[4]

With this as a preface, Flew begins to take Wilson to task. First of all, he says that delineation of the boundaries of indoctrination is not like geographical map-work. One cannot map what one is constantly changing, says Flew. Secondly, Flew feels that Wilson is confusing conditioning with indoctrination. "A wholehearted and systematic programme of indoctrination and man-shaping would very likely involve a certain amount of conditioning.... But, be that as it may, such shaping could scarcely be said to constitute indoctrination, except, perhaps, in so far as it was integrated with, and was an expression of, an ideology."[5]

Flew takes issue with Wilson's examples of religious indoctrination, and makes the point that teaching by threat of damnation is, at best, a poor example of indoctrination. This is because damnation is part of and not extrinsic to the religious doctrine.[6]

Of course, the main problem Flew finds with Wilson's treatment of indoctrination is Wilson's assumption that we would know which beliefs are certain and which are not.

> If you take indoctrination to be necessarily bad, and if, with Wilson, you take it to consist in teaching as known the sort of thing which really is not or cannot be known, then you should expect any conflicts to

> appear as disagreements about what, or what sort of thing, is or is not known.[7]

As an example of disagreement, Flew cites the doctrines of the Catholic Church, which, according to Flew, are described as knowledge. Such arguments as these cannot be so easily brushed aside, says Flew. It is clear that we do not really know what constitutes right content.

Wilson had suggested that behaviour could be indoctrinated, and suggested this example to prove it: If a child is making a great deal of noise and generally disturbing the adults in the course of a visit, and if the parents of the child neglect to censure the child for his behaviour, Wilson contends that they are in fact indoctrinating the child into this kind of behaviour.[8] Flew totally rejects this notion. First of all, says Flew, if the parents are willing to be child-dominated, there is really no reason to censure the child, and secondly, the example is not one of doctrine, and Flew is adamant on the point that indoctrination can only be an issue if doctrine is involved.

Flew is not at all satisfied with Hare's treatment of Wilson. It is not assumed, states Flew, that if there is a right doctrine that someone must know what it is.[9] Flew is also disturbed that Hare is so concerned about the teaching of morals and norms.

> The sort of belief system which constitutes the content of indoctrination typically carries, or is thought to carry, normative implications. Yet any norms as such are precisely not claims about what <u>is</u> but about what <u>ought</u> to be the case. Norms, therefore, provide a possible content for indoctrination

> only to the extent that they are, wrongly, thought to be and presented as a kind of fact.[10]

It is Hare's confusion in this regard that distracts and distorts his analytic vision, according to Flew. Flew claims that Hare is attempting to show how one might teach morality without indoctrinating, and while this may well be a noble objective, he does not tell us what indoctrination is merely by attempting to show us how to dispense with it.

Flew is not satisfied with the 'Aim' distinction Hare puts forward. Flew claims that this merely gets us into a more complicated muddle than before with Wilson.

> If the Wilson criterion is accepted, then the ideological conflicts will, as we have seen, tend to present themselves as disagreements about what is and is not known. But if instead it is urged that the criterion would be educational aim, then this is still no charm to make fundamental disagreements disappear miraculously. They will simply emerge in slightly different forms. It will be contended that Hare's educational ideals are unacceptable, or that indoctrination is not, afer all, always deplorable, or, most probably, both. Thus it may be suggested that the true aim is to produce not just educated people but educated Catholics; and insofar as this involves indoctrination, then perhaps there need be no objection to that.[11]

In short, the problem is moved to another quarter, but not solved, according to Flew.

An adequate analysis, Flew claims, "would have somehow to do justice to two points: that indoctrination must presuppose the aim of implanting beliefs, and that the beliefs to be implanted must be of a certain sort".[12] Flew goes on to say that where the word carries pejorative overtones

it would probably be right to mention that the doctrines which are implanted as if they were true, must either be false or not known to be true.

With this in mind, Flew sets up his primary and secondary senses of indoctrination. He presents us with the secondary sense first. The secondary sense of indoctrination is indoctrination as unacceptable means or manners of teaching.[12] At this point Flew is willing to admit that at times, while the content of what is being taught is not necessarily doctrine, the methods used in instilling this content can be so unacceptable as to constitute indoctrination. The content may even be known to be true.

> The idea then is, presumably, that what is wrong with this teaching is neither its content nor its aim, but that the propositions are being instilled by improper methods or in some inept manner. Indoctrination is thus to be contrasted here not so much with leaving them alone as with teaching them by the right means or in the correct way.[14]

The use of sleep-training or hypnosis would constitute unacceptable methods of teaching. And "these means, if they were to become available, would constitute indoctrination, and as such they would be educationally inadmissable."

The primary sense of indoctrination, as presented by Flew, is indoctrination as the implanting of false or dubious doctrines.[15]

> In the primary sense, we have suggested, indoctrination, where it is taken to be a bad thing, is a matter of trying to implant firm convictions of the truth of doctrines which are in fact either false or at least not known to be true; usually, of course, though not necessarily, the indoctrinator himself believes mistakenly that the doctrines in question are both true

> and known to be true. In the secondary sense indoctrination would be a matter of trying, in any sphere whatever, so implant beliefs, even those which are true and known to be true, by certain disfavoured methods. And the general objection to indoctrination in this sense would presumably be that such methods are in some way incompatible with the production of a proper understanding of what is taught and of a critical appreciation of its logical and epistemological status.[16]

Flew rests his case on the note that 'logical geography' does not necessarily possess "the power to dispel ideological conflicts".[17] He claims that it is because we are not agreed on the aims educators should have, nor are we agreed on what should be taught that the educational theorists provide us with "the vacuous or ambiguous formulae of pseudo-reconciliation".[18]

There are those who would say that Flew's analysis is at least a little ambiguous itself. However, he does show that there is room for both content and method in an analysis of indoctrination. This may well be his greatest contribution, that in dealing with indoctrination no one criterion is sufficient in itself to explain the concept, nor exclusively necessary for its use. There are, of course, problems with what would constitute "unacceptable" methods of teaching, since some methods used in legitimate teaching can become unacceptable through prolonged or aggravated use, and to state accurately when they become unacceptable would be extremely difficult. As well, Flew's case for doctrine is slightly weakened by the introduction of the secondary sense of indoctrination. For, as he admits, "unacceptable"

methods do not necessarily have to apply to doctrine.

Perhaps Flew would have done better to deal with the 'aim' theory, which Hare expounded, at more length. It seems that in terms of the amount of material that has been produced in an attempt to provide the conditions, necessary and sufficient, for indoctrination, that the problem of aim has been of singular importance. The combination of method and content, as Flew would have it, is not satisfactory as is shown by the article 'Indoctrination' written by J.P. White[19] as a reply to Flew's paper. White elaborately examines the possibility of aim and comes up with a very detailed analysis, an analysis which proved to be of considerable importance to many philosophers since it was written.

While White does not, in this article, make direct reference to Flew, in a later paper he claims that this was in fact his intention.[20] However, he describes his concern about indoctrination this way:

> When I used to teach 'Liberal Studies' to Technical College students, I used to find myself in a dilemma... How far was I getting my students consciously or unconsciously to share my own political beliefs however carefully I stuck to the 'facts'? And if they did come to share them was I not indoctrinating them, not educating them? In my very selection of topics to include these political issues was I not doing with different content what a planner of a history syllabus in Soviet Russia does - and wasn't this indoctrination?[21]

White deals briefly with the basic tenets of Hare, Green, and Atkinson, but decides that the most meaningful discussion of the topic would be in terms of aim. To isolate the aim of the indoctrinator, White delineates what he thinks

are the aims of educators in general. At least these are possible aims of educators, or those who simply get children to learn things. White says that the educator might have as his intention that:

> (i) The child should learn words or phrases that he is able to repeat by rote.
>
> (ii) The child should believe that a proposition 'p' is true. This is different from (i) in that in (ii) the child must understand what 'p' means. The child in (i) may learn to repeat the words 'I ought not to steal' without understanding what stealing is. (This is not, of course, to deny that rote learning excludes understanding, but merely to affirm that it does not require it.) But the child in (ii) cannot believe 'p' if he does not know what it means.
>
> (iii) The child should believe that 'p' is true, in such a way that nothing will shake this belief.
>
> (iv) The child should believe that 'p' is true, if and only if he has come to see that there are good grounds for believing it. This implies the intention that the child reject 'p' if he comes to see that there are no good grounds for believing it.[22]

White's contention is that some, while not all, of the controversies which have arisen from the discussion of indoctrination, have arisen because the authors have been defining indoctrination in terms of all four intentions, and he cites examples. Green, for instance, argues that early moral education is indoctrination, and he is defining indoctrination in terms of intention (ii). White, himself, having in mind paradigm cases of indoctrination such as communist systems of 'political education' or the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools, claims that indoctrination can only be defined in terms of intention (iii). "Indoctrina-

ting someone is trying to get him to believe that a proposition 'p' is true, in such a way that nothing will shake that belief."[23]

As we have seen, there are those who do not accept the 'intention' theory of indoctrination. White now deals with these people.

According to White, John Wilson's argument that no intention is needed renders the term 'indoctrination' impotent. Says White, "For if whenever a person comes to have a belief 'y' as a result of my acting on intention 'x', I am indoctrinating him, then I may be indoctrinating someone whenever I act on <u>any</u> intention."[24] Certainly indoctrination must be an activity, claims White, and since it is an activity, "it can only be distinguished from other activities in terms of the particular intention the indoctrinator has in mind."[25]

Another argument against the intention approach is the problem that many indoctrinators have themselves been indoctrinated, and as such can claim that they are really trying to get their charges to understand things for themselves, when they are in fact indoctrinating. When asked, these people will say that their intention is not to indoctrinate. White answers this criticism in this way:

> One criticism of it, as it stands, is that it assumes that the teacher's avowed intention is necessarily his real intention. But is it conceivable that his avowed intention is also his real intention? If so, then if any of his pupils questions a fundamental proposition of the doctrine... he will not fob him off with specious argument or use non-rational tech-

> niques of persuasion to get him to believe the proposition... if the teacher inside the system is an indoctrinator, it is therefore inconceivable that his avowed intention is also his real intention.[26]

White then turns to the argument that doctrine is the only possible content of indoctrination. He grants that it seems only possible that the work implies doctrine, "But another meaning of the word, given in the O.E.D., is simply 'What is taught'."[27] He allows, as well, that some indoctrinators may use an ideology, but not always. His main argument against the limitation imposed by the 'doctrine' definition of indoctrination is in the form of an example. Consider, says White, the case where a teacher gets a child to believe that Melbourne is the capital of Australia. He fixes the belief unshakably, and even discourages the boy from using atlases. White asks, would this not be indoctrination? He thinks it is. The content of what is taught need not be a part of a larger ideology in order for it to constitute indoctrination.

White also argues against the notion that brainwashing and indoctrination are one and the same. Brainwashing, he claims, is a process and its purpose may to enforce a belief, but even if it is a form of indoctrination, "this battering ram is not necessary for indoctrinating children, whose conceptual schemes are not yet formed, and therefore more susceptible to subtler methods." White concludes, "we might choose to define 'indoctrination' as brainwashing, but, as before, nothing turns on this."[28]

White's paper raises several questions. First of all, if intention is the only criterion to be used to determine whether someone is indoctrinating or not, how is one ever to establish whether the educators avowed intention is the same as his real intention? White mentions non-rational techniques, and suspect content and methods, but he has rejected these as necessary and sufficient conditions. Is it not possible that even in the case of a teacher who has been indoctrinated that the teacher's intention is his real intention? Just how do we discover intention? Secondly, who are we to believe, White who says that the content of what is taught need not be doctrine as such, or Flew who claims that only doctrine can form the content of indoctrination? Let us now take a look at some of the counter-arguments which result from all of this.

Willis Moore is an American, and it is interesting to consider his article which was published in the Summer, 1966, issue of Studies in Philosophy and Education. Of course, all the authors previously discussed were British.

Moore seems slightly amused that the British philosophers should be spending so much time and effort attempting to analyze the concept of indoctrination. While the subject may be novel for British educators, he says, "it is one with which Americans are quite familiar."[29]

Moore claims that through continuous debate on the subject, with the liberals such as John Dewey on one side arguing against indoctrination, and some Americans concerned

with indoctrinating the principles of democracy in American youth on the other side favoring it, the Americans have arrived at a generally accepted definition of the term. The American version of indoctrination, according to Moore, is defined in terms of method:

> The current argument among our British colleagues as to whether "indoctrination" should be defined in terms of aim, content, or method, or some combination of these, could hardly occur in the context of contemporary American philosophy of Education. For better or for worse, Dewey's type of outlook, and the accompanying derogatory definition of indoctrination, have so permeated American educational thinking that we automatically deal with this concept in terms of method only.[30]

Moore says that this is "perfectly natural" considering that the political climate of World War II had so much to do with shaping the meaning of indoctrination. Moore admits that the American usage is no more sacred than any other, however, he offers some justification for it:

> Since modes or techniques of teaching are a central concern of the profession of education, key terms so defined as to call attention to real differences in the area have great instrumental value for philosophers of education.[31]

These modes or techniques Moore speaks of are two: the methods employed by the Nazi party, and the free, objective methods long-standing in the American tradition. The employment of either of the two methods was to be by Americans in the teaching of their children the principles of democracy. Moore continues,

> ...since the two modes thus singled out for contrast may be shown to have evolved from and to reflect the nature of two sharply conflicting political philosophies, one of which British and Americans join in

> supporting and one of which they abhor, the current American usage would seem to have much in its favor.[32]

In short, Moore accepts the distinction between Nazi 'indoctrinatory' techniques of education and American 'liberal' techniques of education. He associates 'indoctrination' with authoritarian political philosophy and practice. Because of the stigma attached to the term since the war by the liberals, Moore says that they, the liberals of America, refused to admit that the indoctrinatory techniques had any legitimate use whatsoever. Moore claims that early teaching of children necessarily takes place before the child is able to reason, and the liberals were very uncomfortable about this situation. As a result, "the liberals had to ignore such teaching, define it away, or try to abolish it in practice." As well, some liberals, the more extreme liberals, as Moore calls them, "took the bull by the horns by advocating a nearly total permissiveness in the earliest learning situations, thus eliminating indoctrination in teaching by doing away with teaching." This, Moore feels, is "both impossible and unwise".[33] And he concludes that a necessary part of a child's education is imitative. This imitation of the elders' values and decisions Moore wants to call indoctrination, and he wants to say that it is both necessary and good;

> Even lower animals exemplify the primitive wisdom inherent in imitative learning. The extension of such indoctrination to intentional direction of the behaviour of the immature into what the adult has learned to be safe and value producing paths is a necessary concomitant of the longer period of imatu-

> rity that constitutes one major difference between the human and the non-human infant.[34]

Moore proposes that we accept modifications of the old "liberal theory of education" and admit that indoctrination is necessary at any early age.

The obvious question to ask Moore is this: when does this type of teaching give way to rational discourse? He answers this seemingly difficult question with typical American arrogance:

> With infants in nearly everything and with mature, reasoning adults in very little, the teacher will use indoctrinating procedures. Between these two extremes the proper mixture of the one method with the other is appropriately determined by the degree of rational capability of the learner with regard to the subject matter before him and the degree of urgency of the situation.[35]

Because Moore emphasizes the point that 'Education' is the ideal to be strived for, and indoctrination is to be held to the very minimum, he feels he is not compromising the position of liberal education, as liberals would say he is doing.

Moore goes on to draw distinctions between the liberal educator and the authoritarian educator, with the view to contrasting the indoctrinatory method with the educational method.

> The liberal teacher will encourage the critical attitude, the questioning stance, the tendency to balance possibility against possibility, alternative against alternative. He will so teach that his students will not only not be afraid but even eager to subject to critical review what was taught them before they were capable of being critical, including what he himself has sponsored or endorsed.[36]

The authoritarian, on the other hand, says Moore, "will attempt so to structure the teaching situation that certain basic truths are absorbed by the students and retained indefinitely against all opposition."[37] The authoritarian or indoctrinator will do exactly the opposite of the liberal teacher. Moore mentions other traits of the authoritarian teacher, such as an emphasis on facts and data, and a general neglect for evidence or justification for these facts or data. Moore concludes;

> This definition [of indoctrination] allows us to treat indoctrination as, under certain circumstances, justifiable and even inevitable, thus removing the topic from the jurisdiction of the black versus white kind of thinking, which is rarely, if ever, appropriate in a value situation.[38]

Moore's paper does not so much raise new problems as simply not solve the old ones. Flew produced a response to Moore and Wilson, but before one can assess the response let us take a look at the brief article which Wilson wrote in reply to Flew's first paper.

It is Wilson's wish to restate some of the points Flew raised about his first paper, and not to carry on a type of philosophical infighting,[39] which is of some comfort to the author of this thesis.

Wilson reiterates his claim that to be against indoctrination is to be against illiberal practices. Indoctrination diminishes individual freedom by creating in its subject a belief which, though the subject may think he is holding it with good reasons, is actually not held on good grounds. "The indoctrinated person, as Sartre would say,

is in a state of self-deception: he is sleep-walking or in extreme cases double-thinking."[40]

How does this indoctrination come about? Wilson wants to abandon his first theory, that it is content which decides and now says that neither aim, content, nor method will do as the sole criterion. "Aim alone will not do because it is conceivable that one might think it right to indoctrinate children with certain myths in order to give them a secure framework in which to grow up," and, of course, for Wilson, no matter how liberal the aim or intention, "it would still be indoctrination."[41] Wilson discounts the other two criteria which have been mentioned, method and content:

> Method alone will not do because you can implant beliefs by illegitimate methods, but this only counts as indoctrination in certain cases (where the beliefs might be called doctrines, as Flew rightly says, (pp. 284-285). Content alone will not do because there is presumably a legitimate, or non-indoctrinatory way of teaching the content, e.g., of morality.[42]

However, says Wilson, these criteria can enter into indoctrination. For, the aim is to "stop the person thinking for himself"; the "method must be illegitimate, since it is intended to supplant the reason-and-fact method which we take to be correct; and the content must be such as would be correctly taught by a different, non-indoctrinatory method."[43] But Wilson wants to direct the discussion a different way as he feels that a "good phenomenological account of indoctrination and (more widely) of rational or sane thinking in general as opposed to rationalized or compulsive thinking"[44]

is more important than a dispute between aim, content, or method. He feels that there are all sorts of ways "in which we can compulsively direct another person's thinking". He grants that not all that is directed is indoctrination, but we do through the value implications of our language, "teach children to see things in a certain way." He is not willing to say that this is indoctrination, but that this question has to be settled by empirical psychology. The test would be in the form of the question: Does our particular use of language "increase or diminish the child's rationality, in the sense of his appreciation of and control over reality?"[45]

Wilson is not sure how to deal with religion and religious beliefs with regard to indoctrination. He says he can see how the inculcating of these beliefs could be indoctrinatory, but he asks, "suppose they are ways of seeing the world?" Wilson wants to say that perhaps for children certain ways of viewing the world may be psychologically desirable. He concludes that "we cannot judge religion as a whole until we are clearer about what it is".[46] Wilson ends this article by commenting on Flew's criticism of his 'map-making' analogy:

> Philosophers have not got to choose between trying to 'change the landscape' and being 'mere map-makers'. They effect changes precisely by being map-makers: that is, by offering someone descriptions which he recognizes to be, in terms of his own ends, better: that is, clearer, less conflicting, and less worrying.[47]

Flew's paper "'What is Indoctrination?': Comments on

Moore and Wilson" provides us with such a concise critical response to the two previous essays that no further comment is necessary at this time. It is perhaps significant that Flew admits his main purpose in writing on indoctrination to be an attempt to make philosophers face the fact that the Roman Catholic Church promotes indoctrination:

> For Wilson's comeback, and even perhaps Moore's paper too, provide yet further unintentional illustration of the reluctance to accept and to come to terms with the fact that, certainly in Britain and surely in the U.S.A. also, the most widespread and the most successful programme of indoctrination is that of the schools which maintain their separate and independent existence precisely in order to inculcate belief in the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. Any philosophy of education which is to be in our countries relevant and realistic has got, as I urged in my original article, to face this fact.[48]

With this prologue, Flew comments on Moore.

Flew does not want to argue that the Americans have arrived at a 'method' definition of indoctrination, but he does not feel that this particularly resolves the conflicts.

> Yet even in this American context I still want to suggest that such a notion is too crude to be adequate to the complexity of the issues involved. For, surely, we cannot out of hand dismiss basic differences of logical status in the content of what is taught as irrelevant to the questions of how, if at all, these different sorts of thing ought to be taught.[49]

Something which, according to Flew, Moore does not make explicit is the relevant difference "between, on one hand, the development of values; and, on the other hand, the teaching of matters of fact."[50] Moore, as we have seen, is almost solely concerned with the inculcation of democratic principles, and Flew's point is that aside from the develop-

ment of values there is the basic issue of plain, ordinary teaching, and the possibility that it may be indoctrinatory.

Flew goes on to show that indoctrination cannot be dealt with in as loose terms as Moore would have it. First, he shows on Moore's own grounds that this cannot be done. For Moore accepts the definition of indoctrination as "a one-sided or biased presentation of a debatable issue, a presentation designed to assure a favorable outcome for a predetermined point of view."[51] Flew claims that by including the term 'debatable', Moore has restricted the use of indoctrination.

> The crux is that if you make no such restriction, but instead insist upon a concept of indoctrination which refers to method only, then you weaken the liberal position by exposing a flank to the objection that some considerable measure of indoctrination is practically unavoidable. This objective becomes more serious since in any general debate one is forced to recognize the strength of the popular misconception that differences of degree or quantity, because they are as such not differences of principles, cannot really matter.[52]

Flew's point is, simply, that if you allow a little indoctrination, why not allow a lot? Or, better, how can you avoid not allowing a lot? Flew claims one does not have to allow a little indoctrination. The way to avoid this "is by introducing into the concept of indoctrination some appropriate essential references to content." And once this has been done, "once some such limitation, or limitations, have been made it ceases to be necessary to allow that any indoctrination at all is inevitable."[53] One of these distinctions, as mentioned above, is between matters of fact

and matters of value. Says Flew:

> It is simply false to suggest that either the multiplication table or the fundamental principles of chemistry, physics and biology are evidentially on all fours with Roman Catholic - or any other - positive doctrines about God; whilst a refusal to discern any radical difference between the teaching of facts and the inculcation of values would prejudice the claim to be doing any sort of disciplined philosophy.[54]

Some things are matters of fact, and some are not. Says Flew, there is no reason to assume that we cannot escape teaching some dubious doctrine as fact. And on that note, Flew dismisses Moore.

The first thing that disturbs Flew about Wilson's article is Wilson's appeal to consensus. Wilson's use of 'we' and 'our', when, apparently, there are no grounds for assuming a consensus. Everyone is <u>not</u> concerned about the diminishing of human freedom, responds Flew.

The appeal to consensus tends to distract from other reasons people may have for disagreeing with the practise of indoctrination. Flew is disappointed that Wilson has abandoned his earlier contribution, which was indoctrination as concerning the 'truth and evidence' of beliefs.

Flew attacks Wilson's latest contention that beliefs must always be supported by some intelligible reason. The person holding the belief, according to Wilson should always be able to give reasons for holding it. Not so, says Flew. Intelligibility may be essential, "but it is a bit difficult to think up any reasons why Wilson should believe that a true believer must as such be able to give reasons", says

Flew, unless Wilson is counting the reasons as a necessary condition for counting a belief as rational.[55] Flew wonders what reasons Wilson might have for holding this belief about beliefs. Surely Wilson must be wrong, he says, for if he were right it would mean that a person incapable of holding or giving reasons would be incapable of having any beliefs. According to Flew, "beliefs may be, and often are, entirely irrational, but cannot be wholly non-rational".[56]

Flew agrees with Wilson's reasons for rejecting aim and method, but disagrees with his reasons for disallowing content. Wilson's reason was that "there is presumably a legitimate or non-indoctrinatory way of teaching the content, e.g., of morality".[57] Flew disagrees, "first, because the example of morality is at the very least eccentric to indoctrination; and, second, because unless doctrines are essential to morality, it becomes uncertain whether there is any example to make exactly Wilson's point."[58] If, as Wilson claimed in his first article, doctrines are essentially uncertain, there can be no non-indoctrinatory way of teaching them as certain. Flew concludes this part of his criticism:

> To insist once more on what is locally the most important case: it necessarily must be indoctrination to teach would be factual religious beliefs as religious knowledge; unless these beliefs themselves - as opposed to the beliefs that they have been and are believed by many - do themselves constitute knowledge.[59]

Wilson's uncertainty about religion deeply disturbs Flew. It is not a question of whether some religions have

something to say about the way the world is, says Flew, but rather a case that certain religions teach doctrine as fact.

> the central and distinctive doctrines of traditional Christianity are intended by the orthodox to be in some way factual; notwithstanding all the attendant logical difficulties. And what I was, and am taking, as for us the outstanding paradigm case of indoctrination is not the teaching of religion in general - any religion, anytime. It is the enormous and generally effective effort made in our own two countries now by a particular highly traditional Christian Church, which seeks to fix in the minds of children an unshakable conviction of the truth of its specific distinctive doctrines.[60]

The important point, in Flew's opinion, is that it is common for people to believe "that which involves self-contradiction or is logically vicious in some other way and which, therefore, may be said to be senseless in the philosophers' strict sense."[61] Nothing can rate as a belief unless it is at least in "some ordinary weak lay sense intelligble", Flew claims, "And of course intelligibility of this weak sort is the only sort of intelligibility that need be required of something before it may be viewed as a possible belief and hence as possible content for indoctrination."[62]

In closing, Flew points out that the type of "toothless religion" Wilson may have in mind would not really pose a threat as it would not be considered to have a doctrine. "No doctrines; no indoctrination!"

And so Flew considers the criticisms of Wilson's paper refuted. His position remains that indoctrination must involve the teaching of false or dubious doctrine as true, or the teaching of true doctrine by unacceptable means, or a combination of both. Perhaps Flew's criticisms of Hare,

Wilson and Moore are sufficient, but he does not really come to terms with the aim theory. As he makes no comment on White's elaborate account, we cannot judge him in that regard. However, Flew does accept Wilson's reasons for rejecting aim which are indeed shaky. Wilson says that aim will not do because a person may feel it is all right to indoctrinate children in order to give them a framework of security within which to grow up. He does not say that this is not indoctrination. He is merely saying that the indoctrinator feels he is right in indoctrinating. But, one must ask, do not many indoctrinators feel they are right? As well, Flew's paradigm case of religious indoctrination may well stand - but what of other types of indoctrination? Who is to decide the certainty or uncertainty of political doctrines? And further, what of White's claim that indoctrination involves not only doctrine, but, simply, "what is taught"? We might assume that Flew is merely waging a one man war on the Separate School system, and not really getting to the heart of the general problem of indoctrination at all.

While the 'aim, content, method' approach is not dead, let us now take a look at yet another approach to the delineation of the concept of indoctrination, this time from the point of view of the concept of teaching.

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CHAPTER IV

INDOCTRINATION AND TEACHING

Brian S. Crittenden is skeptical as to whether or not the approach to the task of isolating the necessary and sufficient conditions for indoctrination employed by the previous authors best serves their efforts. He suggests an alternate approach, which is to approach the concept of indoctrination through the concept of teaching.[1]

Crittenden hopes to isolate the necessary and sufficient conditions for teaching, and thus show how indoctrination must necessarily be different from anything that teaching includes. He begins by pointing out that teaching "is an intentional activity". This is important because it excludes activities which may influence the behaviour of others without knowledge of the teacher. As an intentional activity teaching "excludes merely giving information, or telling a person what to do on an occasion".[2] The teacher, Crittenden claims, must adapt his performance in such a way as to ensure retention on the part of the subject.

Crittenden prefers to think of teaching as a multidimensional activity, involving:

> telling, questioning, explaining, instructing, informing, giving examples, persuading, demonstrating, training, drilling, conditioning, gesturing, setting an example, structuring a situation, approving, reproving, correcting, grading, and so on.[3]

The multidimensional nature of teaching makes the task of

distinguishing it from other intentional activities which effect similar results more difficult. While certain paradigm cases, such as the use of drugs or brain operations, are clearly not teaching, hypnosis or shock conditioning could be examples of "giving instruction".[4]

Crittenden says that since the purpose of teaching is learning, "the procedures which count as teaching may be clarified by examining the conditions required for learning." And these are, he proceeds, "that enduring changes in thought or behaviour are not learned unless there is conscious (though not necessarily self-conscious) adaptation in the subject."[5] Crittenden, after pointing out the subtle distinctions between teaching as a 'task' and an 'achievement' word, decides that "selling is to buying as teaching is to receiving instruction or advertising is to buying as teaching is to learning", and he concludes:

> In summary, the necessary conditions for an activity to be called 'teaching' (and these apply to both verbal and non-verbal activities) are: (1) that the agent intends what he does to effect an enduring change in the subject's way of thinking or acting; (2) that the procedures adopted fall within the range of activities that are broadly classified as 'instructing, training, exemplifying, guiding' and are consistent with the conditions required for learning (in particular, a conscious adaptation by the subject to the influence of the agent); and (3) that in the particular situation it is reasonable to assume that the content presented and the procedures adopted are apt to produce learning.[6]

Crittenden then says that if the conditions as set out above are sufficient for an activity to be called teaching, then not all teaching is, or need be, done in the school, and

"the concept of teaching does not have an evaluative component." He exemplifies this by showing that

> Given the intention and the technical appropriateness of the procedure, it is logically correct to say that an adult teaches a child to believe what is false... or that Fagin taught Oliver Twist and the others to be pickpockets.[7]

Fagin may be judged to be morally wrong, says Crittenden, but this may be outside the original teaching.

Crittenden now wishes to distinguish between teaching in the school (teaching(S)) and general teaching. Teaching (S) is within the framework of education and unlike teaching in general, it has an "inbuilt element of evaluation". This is because teaching(S) must meet requirements of significance, desirability, etc. The value society places on this type of teaching is exemplified by the compulsion of students to go to school in some societies as long as ten years. Crittenden goes on to say that it is because of this evaluative aspect of teaching(S) that we can ask questions about right criteria of schooling, and whether or not teaching(S) meets the value criteria commonly accepted by this society.[8]

These criteria, according to Crittenden, would be based on the concept of schooling as it has developed throughout history.

> What seems to be essential to the concept of schooling throughout the history of the institution is that it involves initiation into the best available body of theory for explaining and interpreting man and his world and for guiding human action, along with the various methods of inquiry through which the theory

> has been developed; and the acquisition of skill for applying, at least in part, this theory and the methods of inquiry.[9]

These criteria allow us to distinguish between essential teaching discourse and that which is trivial or miseducative. As well, says Crittenden, it allows us to exclude from school the following:

> the teaching of what is false or wrong as though it were true or right; what is probable as certain; what is metaphorical as literal; what is policy as a theory; making claims without evidence or giving evidence which is inadequate or inappropriate; giving motivations in the guise of research.[10]

Crittenden points out that it makes no difference whether "the teacher is malicious or merely mistaken in failing to meet these criteria." Miseducation is miseducation. The criteria would also exclude certain methods of teaching "which violated the conditions for learning implicit in the general nature of inquiry."[11] Significantly, the teacher may conform to the wishes of his students but still be miseducating them, says Crittenden. For students can be and often are, satisfied with inadequate or wrong reasons.

Crittenden claims that moral education is also part of the criteria for teaching(S). Providing the teacher uses acceptable methods of inquiry, he can persuade or defend certain value positions. In fact, the teacher must "be committed to the values involved in the methods of inquiry (e.g., humility in the face of evidence, integrity, honesty, thoroughness, courage in defending what is true and criticizing what is false) and to the general principles of mora-

lity (e.g., treating his students as being essentially equal moral agents) and that he encourage this commitment in his students."[12]

Crittenden rejects the notion that indoctrination is what goes on in totalitarian societies, and education is what transpires in democratic societies. He says that it is all tooconceivable that teachers in a democracy could be miseducating. The appeal, says Crittenden, should not be to political concepts but "it must involve an investigation of the criteria and conditions for knowledge and inquiry along with an appeal to some moral principles."[13] To claim that the Russians indoctrinate, one must show that their theories "are not warranted by the available evidence." Here Crittenden mentions the Catholic Church phenomenon:

> There is a similar requirement of proof in the case of the assertion that the schools of a religious institution like the Roman Catholic Church are fundamentally miseducative. The doctrines about God, revelation through a Divine-Human being, a Divinely-guided teaching authority in the world, history as the unfolding of a Divine plan presumably entail assumptions about the nature of reality and human knowledge. An adequate critique must be able to challenge this general theory. It is not sufficient to intone slogans about democracy and authoritarianism.[14]

While dictionary usage gives indoctrination a neutral definition, Crittenden claims that the use that is prevalent today is pejorative. Indoctrination as Crittenden sees it does not exclude or include certain beliefs or methods, but rather "the crucial condition... is that they should be part of a world-view or comprehensive 'philosophy' of life."[15] By this token, says Crittenden, "in certain circumstances

teaching science and the scientific method would properly be referred to as indoctrination." Crittenden continues, "when the world-view being presented in the school is, in fact, the official ideology of the social order to which both teacher and student belong I think we have the paradigm situation for the use of indoctrination." The criteria for indoctrination, says Crittenden, in either positive or negative connotations, "are in general those which have already been given for distinguishing between teaching which is educative and that which is miseducative."[16] However, Crittenden feels it would serve philosophical purposes better if indoctrination were limited to certain forms of miseducation. Thus:

> The content of teaching that might, under certain conditions, be referred to as indoctrination(M) are those bodies of belief and knowledge, their methods of acquisition and justification (and the consequences in attitude and action entailed by their acceptance) which constitute a general view of life. This 'view' or 'philosophy' of life would be usually, though not necessarily, the official ideology of the society in which the school exists.[17]

Crittenden concludes by giving the conditions necessary for indoctrination(M) given the specified area of content; either of the following conditions is sufficient:

> (i) If the teacher presents the specified content in such a way that he violates the criteria of inquiry - unwarranted claims, suppression of critical evaluation of reasons and evidence, etc.
>
> (ii) If the teacher uses any pedagogical method in the presentation of the specified content which is inconsistent with the requirements of the general nature of inquiry and moral principles, assuming that intellectual and emotional development of his students is taken into account.[18]

Crittenden reiterates that it does not matter whether or not the teacher is in good faith.

No doubt anticipating the question about what might constitute intelligent inquiry, Crittenden claims:

> An adequate account of what constitutes intelligent inquiry should be sufficiently pluralistic to encompass the various modes of knowledge without giving primacy to any single model. For this reason it is a mistake to assume that by appealing to the criteria of inquiry one is committed to some kind of arid rationalism.[19]

It is interesting to point out, in closing, that Crittenden feels there is no difference between the "moral training of young children and their being taught a first language."

Aside from the obvious problems involved with establishing just what might constitute the prevailing 'ideology', let alone the prevailing morality, one wonders if Crittenden has done any more than given us his version of what might constitute good and bad teaching. Indoctrination seems to be merely a variation of what Crittenden calls bad teaching. As well, if teaching is an intentional activity, as he points out at the outset, would it not at least be necessary for the teacher to <u>intend</u> to educate, even though the outcome is miseducation? And if teaching is an intentional activity, surely there must be instances where indoctrination is an intentional activity. Surely this is possible within the "broad range of activities" which he claims are essential to teaching.

In general, it is possible that among all the conditions which Crittenden sets for indoctrination (given teach-

ing(S), indoctrination(M) would occur with the given conditions....) are included some conditions for indoctrination. But to establish whether or not these are sufficient conditions would require one to deal with a whole host of clarifications including; can a teacher indoctrinate when he does not even intend to teach? What are unacceptable methods of teaching? How many reasons are enough reasons? How does one indoctrinate mathematics? How does one give good reasons for a moral judgment? Is it not possible that the school itself is a vehicle of an ideology, and that everything that goes on in the school is indoctrination merely by virtue of the fact that it goes on in the school? And many, many more.

However, in closing, it may be that Crittenden has indeed touched on a way out of the dilemma, even, possibly, unknowingly. For by illustrating the complexity of the definition of indoctrination, even more than has yet been done, he may be showing us the way to a definition in terms of something other than necessary and sufficient conditions. This possibility will be discussed later. For the present, there are yet two more publications on the subject of aim, content, and method to be dealt with. Both were written in 1970, and both pursue the now traditional approach to the problem.

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CHAPTER V

THE 'INTENTION' CRITERION - A FINAL LOOK

I.M.M. Gregroy and R.G. Woods co-authored a rather lengthy work entitled "Indoctrination"[1] in reply to White's paper "Indoctrination", which is dealt with earlier in this thesis. The tactic employed by Gregory and Woods is to closely examine the nature of what are considered paradigm cases of indoctrination, such as communist systems of 'political education', or the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools. Their reasoning is that you can find out what indoctrination is by examining paradigm cases of indoctrination.[2]

Gregory and Woods settle the 'doctrine' issue by simply stating that their paradigm cases involve doctrine. Catholicism and Communism involve doctrines. It is also important to note that these particular doctrines are of a specific type. They are related to action and activity:

> From the standpoint of the believer they have the status of universal, unfalsifiable truths, and this fact, plus the fact that the beliefs in question are of momentous concern to mankind, leads to a strong urge to convince others, the waverers, the unbelievers, of their essential truth. It becomes important to persuade others to believe. There may be other defining characteristics, but these seem to us to be the salient ones.[3]

While Gregory and Woods are satisfied that doctrine is central to the Catholic and Communist ideologies, they are concerned with delineating other possibilities, for clearly

there must be other forms of indoctrination. But before they leave their paradigm cases, they examine the roles that aim, content, and method play in these cases.

Since "it seems reasonable to say that 'indoctrinate' means 'to inculcate doctrine'; intention is logically necessary in that it is bound up with the notion of inculcation."[4] They delineate three types of intention; (a) cases in which the indoctrinator admits his intentions, (b) where the indoctrinator refuses to admit his 'true' intentions, and in this case the 'real' intention can be inferred on "contextual grounds", and (c) where the indoctrinator intends to instill belief, and admits this, but claims immunity by virtue of the content of his teaching, as in the case of religious issues. This last is most interesting. For the teacher may even be oblivious of his real intentions. But this does not necessarily save him from accusations of indoctrination:

> The uncommitted teacher may have no intention of bringing about certain beliefs, but his position of authority within the institutional set-up, his role as teacher, lends powerful backing to his words; the system within which he operates endows his actions with a sense of purpose of which he, as an individual, may be quite unaware. We are loathe to talk about things like, 'the intentions of society', but, in this context, such talk begins to look as if it makes sense.[5]

With regard to method, Gregory and Woods claim that there is no particular method as such which is the sole method of indoctrination.

In sum, <u>how</u> one goes about the job will be dictated

> by circumstance. But while no one particular method is necessary to the concept of indoctrination, method is nevertheless logically involved in so far as the indoctrinatory transaction necessary involves lack of regard for the rationality of the person being subjected to indoctrination.[6]

The content, of course, as has been mentioned earlier, must consist of a doctrine. Gregory and Woods now go into detail on this subject. They first set out to show that doctrine is fundamentally different from theory, as in the physical sciences. Just as one does not talk about the molecular 'doctrine', they say, one does not talk about religious 'theory'. "It is a logical nonsense to talk, in the sphere of religion, of the setting up of hypotheses and of the subsequent attempt to confirm or disconfirm them experimentally."[7] For this reason, according to Gregory and Woods, one simply cannot indoctrinate, for example, physics.

Gregory and Woods do not want to limit doctrines to religious and political arenas, and they illustrate this idea with some philosophical doctrines ascribed to Berkeley and Moore and conclude,

> The upshot of all this is that there is a plethora of doctrines of a more or less systematic kind and more or less related to the notion of purposive activity, and many of these will certainly have little or nothing to do with Communist or Catholic ideology.[8]

Gregory and Woods then turn their efforts to critically examining John White's position on indoctrination.[9] They first take issue over White's contention that content has nothing to do with isolating the concept of indoctrina-

tion. They claim that White's only ground for making this claim is that he rejects the notion that doctrine is essential to indoctrination, and this White bases on the OED's definition of the term. Gregory and Woods do not feel that reference to the dictionary is sufficient argument:

> To say, in such a case, that an appeal to the dictionary constitutes an appeal to linguistic usage is, we suggest, simply false. In the particular case under discussion it is clear that usage does not sanction the blanket definition of 'doctrine' as 'what is taught'. Suppose, for example, that we teach a child to do up his shoelaces, and suppose we are subsequently asked, 'What did you teach that child?', and we reply, 'We taught him how to do up his shoelaces'. Then is it seriously contended that there is a use of the word 'doctrine' such that how to do up shoelaces can be correctly described as a matter of doctrine?[10]

They conclude that White's only real reason for rejecting content is his dictionary.[11] As White gives examples of indoctrination where the content is not doctrine, Gregory and Woods feel obliged to deal with this approach.

White presented hypothetical cases like, 'What if you got a child to believe that Melbourne is the Capital of Australia?', etc., and Gregory and Woods say it is like indoctrination, "and it is like practical joking, and it is like the act of a con man. But it isn't <u>exactly</u> like indoctrination; it has only got features in common."[12] White's 'unshakability' test is not sufficient, say Gregory and Woods. What is the difference, they ask, between a teacher simply saying 'that is a palm tree' or 'Uranus has seven moons', how does the teacher know if the child believes either of the propositions, whether true or false, unshak-

ably? He cannot, say Gregory and Woods.

> The acid test of whether or not indoctrination is successful seems to lie precisely in the being able to withstand the counter-arguments and counter-claims of one's ideological-counterparts at least in the paradigm cases-opponents.[13]

Gregory and Woods rest their case.

John White replied to this article in the same publication, and it seems only fair to note his reactions to Gregory and Woods' criticisms.

White, in his article "Indoctrination - Reply to I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods",[14] says he made two claims, one weaker, the other stronger, about the content issue which so occupies Gregory and Woods. The weaker claim is that indoctrinated beliefs need not form systems of beliefs, and the stronger claim, "that indoctrinated beliefs could be <u>of any kind whatever</u>."[15]

White says it is false to claim that a doctrine must consist of a system of beliefs, simply because there are doctrines which are single propositions, for example, 'Every event has a cause'.

In the same vein, Gregory and Woods claim that a doctrine or indoctrinated propositions are are not known to be true or false, and further claim that true propositions cannot be indoctrinated, and to this White replies that since the doctrine <u>may</u> be true, and since it <u>may</u> be indoctrinated, true propositions may be indoctrinated.[16] Further, says White, "not every ideology need rest on an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition. Plato's 'noble lie', that men

are made of different metals, is not: it can be shown to be false."[17]

White then proceeds to present three examples of cases of the inculcation of unshakable beliefs. The first example, (i), is as follows: A attempts to get B to believe some doctrinal faith. A's purpose is simply to get B to believe the propositions and know them by rote. The second example, (ii), is somewhat different: A wants to keep B meek and uncritical. A is a member of the minority who rules, and B is a member of the majority who is ruled. A teaches the ideology to B, but is not concerned that B retain it, nor is he concerned if B even gets it all wrong, so long as B remains subservient. The third example, (iii), is the most significant:

> A is a school teacher in a working class district, deeply concerned, for the sake of the country's economic growth and political stability, with the old problem of producing a docile labour-force. He tries in various ways to stamp into his pupils... the belief that they are fitted only to become manual workers - not by getting them to accept any system of beliefs, but by, for instance, engaging them in all sorts of in-and out-of-school projects - visits to factories, bus-garages, etc. - designed to make them feel that manual work is for them. He invites policemen, clergymen and magistrates to give talks at school so as to reinforce respect for authority figures....[18]

White's point is that Gregory and Woods would claim that the first and second cases are cases of indoctrination, while the third is not, as the third does not involve an ideology or doctrine. White claims that the second example is more like the third than like the first, in that the doctrine in the second is not really important. And, "As a

method [ii] is on a par with the various non-doctrinal devices used for the very same purposes in (iii)." In both (ii) and (iii), "A is trying to get B to believe that he should be a placid 'hewer of wood': only the means are different."[19]

Regarding Gregory and Woods' claim that White is not substantiated in his usage of the term 'doctrine', White replies that they give no evidence for their usage. White asks if an opinion poll would be necessary to substantiate his claim, and then wonders just what percentage of the public would have to plump for one or the other use in order to be justified in using it. Further, White feels he is justified in his usage, for, he says, how else would one describe the 'implanting of unshakable beliefs', if not by the term 'indoctrination'?[20]

Gregory and Woods claim that a teacher can indoctrinate unknowingly. White says that this is impossible. "The teachers may be engaged in work of an indoctrinatory kind; but they are not indoctrinators, I half wish to say, but rather unwitting tools in the real indoctrinator's hands." The real indoctrinator may be the person who arranged the curriculum within which the teachers work, and as such "for each teacher there is nothing necessarily indoctrinatory about his work; but piece what they each do together into a whole, and the indoctrinatory purpose becomes clear."[21]

White's stronger claim is that any sort of proposition can be indoctrinated. He now asks the question this way:

> Is there any kind of proposition that cannot be indoctrinated? Non-doctrinal propositions can be. True ones can be. False ones can be. What about propositions known by the indoctrinator to be false?[22]

Gregory and Woods would say no. They say that the indoctrinated must be able to withstand counter-arguments. But White says this is only one way of fixing a belief. The indoctrinator could knowingly indoctrinate false beliefs and arrange that the person indoctrinated never be allowed to meet counter-arguments. He cites as an example the fact that the Russians 'discourage' their citizens from travelling abroad, and thus are not faced with the truths about certain conditions in certain countries which may have been falsely presented in their own country.[23]

Thus White remains adamant on his basic arguments as presented in his first article. Indoctrination, whatever else it may include, must always be intentional.

The last article to appear on the topic of indoctrination is "The Concept of Indoctrination", written by A. Snook. This paper is based on the author's Ph.D. thesis presented at the University of Illinois, in 1968, but was published in 1970.[24]

Snook's contribution is lengthy, and it would be impossible to trace his article step by step to the point where he begins to draw his own conclusions, and for this reason, considering the scope of this thesis, let it suffice to briefly outline the body of his work and then concentrate on his actual positive contributions to the discussion.

Snook considers the arguments of most of the authors mentioned and dealt with in this thesis, and criticizes their efforts much in the way that they have been criticized by each other, with the exception that Snook ends up on the intention end of the spectrum, with a little affection for method.[25] He feels that White's 'intention' approach "comes close to a correct analysis of indoctrination". Snook means that White is right in holding that "intention is the key criterion of indoctrination." However, Snook sees three problems with White's analysis. Snook says that the intention to impart unshakable beliefs may be a necessary condition, but not sufficient. He feels that White must make some reference to content, for, otherwise, a teacher could conceivably 'indoctrinate' the mathematical tables, merely by having the intention to do so.

Secondly, says Snook, White's examples deal with false propositions, and do not allow for the indoctrinating of true propositions. The third problem, as Snook sees it, is the problem of determining intentions - avowed intention, real intention, etc.[26]

Snook now begins his own analysis. First he sets out the task:

> It can be said that any attempt to isolate the essence of indoctrination must take account of the following cases.
>
> (1) Cases which are clearly indoctrination:
> (a) Teaching an ideology as if it were the only possible one with any claim to rationality.

(b) Teaching, as if they are certain, propositions the teacher knows are uncertain.
(c) Teaching propositions which are false and known by the teacher to be false.

(2) Cases which may seem like indoctrination, but which are not since they are unavoidable:
(a) Teaching young children correct behaviour.
(b) Teaching facts (e.g., the tables) by rote.
(c) Influencing the child unconsciously in certain directions.

(3) Problematic cases:
(a) Inculcating doctrines believed by the teacher to be certain, but which are substantially disputed.
(b) Teaching any subject, e.g., chemistry, without due concern for understanding.[27]

Snook then shows how by this format method, content and aim can all account for certain types of indoctrination, but not all. Method can take care of all cases in 1, but only handles 3a of the problem cases. The content theory, as Flew holds it, rules out 1b and 1c as indoctrination, as well as all the cases under 2. The linking of content and method makes the case more tenable, says Snook, but it does not completely solve the problem; "for it means that no matter how the teacher teaches nor how illiberal his aim, he cannot indoctrinate propositions which are certain." Further, says Snook,

> If aim and content are joined, all cases of indoctrination are accounted for, but again, the illiberal scientist is excused along with the harassed teacher. If aim is linked with method, the religious or political indoctrinator is excused provided he adopts a 'democratic' method. To hold that aim, content, and method are required would provide a sufficient condition but not a necessary one; for it rules out the illiberal scientist on grounds of content, and a clever political or religious indoctrinator on grounds of method.[28]

Snook now claims that intention is the only viable criterion for distinguishing indoctrination from education. His final position is as follows:

> I suggest that the following provides a necessary and sufficient condition for indoctrination: A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches with the intention that the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence.[29]

By this condition, Snook claims that a teacher indoctrinates when he intends to indoctrinate, or when he intends to have his pupils hold beliefs regardless of evidence.

While indoctrination must be intentional, according to Snook,

> the intention need not be one to indoctrinate, in the sense that the person would answer 'indoctrinating' when asked what he was doing. However, he must intend something and normally that would be to teach. This brings out the connection between teaching and indoctrination. It is pointless to talk of indoctrinating unless the agent is doing something which could correctly be described as teaching.[30]

Snook is convinced that his analysis covers all the cases under 1, above, rules out all the cases under 2, and includes case 3a, while excluding 3b in certain circumstances. Certain intentions could render 3b a case of indoctrination.[31]

Snook agrees that it would be difficult to make a charge of indoctrination 'stick', but feels that this is not important for the analysis. What is important, he says, is to understand what is <u>meant</u> by indoctrination.

In conclusion, Snook maintains that while intention is paramount to indoctrination, method and content are important, for they can act as indicators of the real intention.

"The concept can include them, but a motive is needed to explain them."[32]

Perhaps had Snook the opportunity to read White's latest work, he would have changed his stance somewhat, for White, as we have seen, deals with most of the criticisms Snook raises, even though White was answering Gregory and Woods.

Snook claims agreement with White except for three problems: (1) the imparting of unshakable beliefs can be necessary but not sufficient, as one must teach the mathematical tables. But White claims that because one <u>can</u> indoctrinate true propositions, it is possible to indoctrinate even mathematical tables, although he has difficulty seeing why anyone would want to do it. (2) Snook says that White does not deal with true propositions, but in fact, White does deal with these in his later paper, as was shown earlier. (3) White does not handle the problem of determining intention sufficiently. But here Snook claims that this is not really significant in any case, so why should he even attack White on this point? It seems, therefore, that Snook and White are only minimally in disagreement. If this is the case, then Snook joins the ranks of the 'aim' theorists, and must bear the brunt of the arguments from Flew, Wilson, and all those who take the other points of view.

There are a few basic points which should be brought out about Snooks paper before leaving the whole area. His examples of cases which 'seem like indoctrination' must be

questioned. Why does Snook assume that teaching young children 'correct behaviour' is not indoctrination, merely because it is unavoidable? Is avoidability another hidden criterion for indoctrination? Also, since one may indoctrinate facts, one might have the intention to teach facts by rote and thus indoctrinate a child, but Snook claims that this cannot be. Why not? White says it can be done. Why should we not believe White's argument?

The time has come to show just what the problems are with the 'intention' theory. First of all, just what must the intention consist of? Must the indoctrinator intend to indoctrinate? If this is so, just what are we talking about, intentions or indoctrination? Clearly, the intention to indoctrinate is not the same as indoctrination. As well, is it not possible for the indoctrinator to intend to indoctrinate and fail to do so? As long as no indoctrination takes place there is no obvious reason to discuss indoctrination.

Snook's claim that we need not be concerned as philosophers about being able to delineate cases of indoctrination, but merely about knowing what indoctrination is, is rather empty. How then are we to distinguish between one who intends to indoctrinate and succeeds, and one who intends to indoctrinate and fails? Could it really be that it makes no difference? Clearly, there must be other features of indoctrination which are needed to help us in this regard. One must make claims to content or method or both in order

to distinguish the indoctrinator from the legitimate teacher.

The 'content' criterion must also be questioned, however. Flew claims that doctrine is essential to indoctrination, but White provides a convincing argument which shows that practically anything can be indoctrinated in terms of content. The case for indoctrination may be stronger if doctrine is involved, but it does not seem to be a necessary condition. As White shows, one can in fact indoctrinate propositions which are not doctrinal in nature.

The 'method' argument is not to be completely ignored. If the intention of an indoctrinator is important, and it seems that it is important, the methods of teaching employed by the suspected indoctrinator will be a useful tool for exposing his intentions. In fact, it may be possible to show that some cases of indoctrination may be delineated solely by certain abusive methods used by the teacher.

In summary, then, the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for indoctrination has indeed revealed a good number of features of indoctrination, some, perhaps more important than others. But no one of these has been adequately shown to be necessary and sufficient. I will now attempt to provide an alternate approach to the problem, an approach which does not rely on necessary and sufficient conditions.

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CHAPTER VI

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE

It was not my primary purpose in the earlier chapters to offer my own criticisms of the contributing authors. Rather, I felt that the purpose of critical discussion is far better served by the philosophers themselves, than I could possibly offer myself in the limited scope of this thesis.

What I hope to have shown thus far, through the sequential arrangement of the arguments, is the direction and flow of the discussion on the concept of indoctrination over the past few years and the general lack of agreement which has evidenced itself. The philosophers in question concerned themselves with the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for indoctrination. While there are probably many more reasons which could be brought to bear in the dispute over aim, content and method, it seems to me that these discussions are presently at a stalemate.

The contributing authors have exhibited what I believe to be a singularly important common characteristic: their approach has been guided by the concern to accurately delineate the boundaries of indoctrination. In order to do this they must 'discover' the conditions which are necessary and sufficient to cases of indoctrination. I wish now to question the pervasive assumption that such conditions must exist.

There are, certainly, some concepts which are regulated in their use by conditions which are necessary and sufficient to warrant their application. But there are also concepts which are not clearly defined and whose borders are hazy. One might describe such concepts as 'rough-edged' concepts; concepts which do not have clear and distinct boundaries. These are opposed to 'round-edged' concepts which do not have clear borders. Wittgenstein provides a good example of the former type of concept, that is, the rough-edged concept with his example of 'games'. I will go into his discussion at some length later.

The philosophers presented earlier have attempted to analyze indoctrination on the assumption that it is a 'round-edged' concept. Starting from what they call clear cases of indoctrination, such as the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools or the teaching of ideological communism in the Soviet system of education, they attempted to extrapolate from these examples to be able to deal with more obscure cases of indoctrination. This, of course, led them on their search for the well-rounded edges of the concept, in other words, for the necessary and sufficient conditions. The question is whether or not the concept of indoctrination is in fact a 'round-edged' concept, or whether it is a more vague or 'rough-edged' concept. As an aid to answering this question I will look at what Ryle, Wittengenstein, Alston and Hospers have to say about vague concepts.

Gilbert Ryle, while dealing with the meaning of 'intellectual', questions the necessity of clarity in regard to certain concepts:

> But, after all, does it matter if all attempts at giving a hard-edged definition of 'intellectual' and 'thought' break down somewhere or other? We know well enough how to distinguish urban from rustic areas, games from work, and spring from summer, and are unembarrassed by the discovery of undecidable marginal cases... Our daily use of the concepts of the intellect and of thought is unembarrassed by the discovery of a moderate number of borderline cases.[1]

Ryle is playing down the concern over marginal cases, satisfied that ordinary usage of language is usually specific enough to tell us whether a particular term is applicable. Ryle says we need not ordinarily be concerned or troubled with the margins of the concepts we use should they be unclear.

Wittengenstein's famous example of the definition of 'games' shows that there are not always necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term. He says we are deluding ourselves when we simply assume that there are essences of human activities, and as such, of concepts.

> Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part of the <u>general form of propositions</u> and of language."[2]

Wittgenstein adds:

> And this is true. Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that

> these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language".[3]

Wittgenstein then goes on to give the 'game' example, in which he shows how we apply the term 'game' to many different activities, not on the basis that there is a common definitive thread that runs through all activities that are games, but rather that all the activities that we call 'games' are related to each other in different ways. Wittgenstein admonishes,

> Don;t say: "There must be something in common, or they would not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat; don't think, but look![4]

When you look at games, says Wittgenstein, you will find that from game to game certain similarities will appear and then drop out, and new similarities will appear,

> And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities over-lapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.[5]

Wittgenstein calls these resemblances 'family resemblances'. Two games can have very little or even nothing in common with each other, but can hold certain features in common with other games. According to Wittgenstein, there are no necessary and sufficient criteria for the term 'game' to be applied.

> ...the strength of the thread does not reside in the

> fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.[6]

We must not assume, says Wittgenstein, that the concept of 'game' necessarily has boundaries. He asks,

> For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word 'game'.)[7]

How then does one explain what a game is? You describe a game, says Wittgenstein. The concept may be a bit blurry, but this does not trouble Wittgenstein. We may even want indistinct concepts from time to time, he says, just as sometimes we prefer an indistinct photograph to a distinct one.[8]

John Hospers enlarges on the 'family resemblance' notion that Wittgenstein introduced. Hospers talks of 'defining characteristics' as conditions sufficient to warrant the application of a term. In his discussion of defining the word 'dog', he points out that 'being a mammal' is clearly a defining characteristic of 'dog',

> But this doesn't get us far, for there are countless mammals that aren't dogs. When we go on to consider other "doggish" characteristics, we may find one or two that we could consider defining, but for the most part we find a cluster of characteristics associated with the word "dog", not all of which have to be present; in fact, each of them can be absent (and therefore the characteristic is not defining) and the creature be still a dog as long as all, most, or some (this varies too) of the other characteristics are there.[9]

Hospers is concerned to show that defining characteristics of a concept may not be many, but are reinforced by other

characteristics which may not be defining. The defining characteristics are usually too broad to adequately delineate a concept, and we thus find a cluster of characteristics which serve to refine our concept while not, in themselves, being sufficient to define the concept. He goes on:

> We began with the picture of a word designating all of a definite number of characteristics, let's say A, B, C, and D; unless a thing had all four of these, it would not be an X. But now we find that in the case of many words (most words?), it can be an X and have only A, B, and C, or A, B, and D, or A, C, and D, or B, C, and D; thus none of the four is defining. Indeed, it might be an X and have only A and B, or A and C, or B and D, etc.[10]

With regard to some words, Hospers is of the opinion that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions governing their usage. There may be some sufficient conditions, and there may even be one or more necessary conditions, but there does not necessarily have to be both:

> Among a definite set of characteristics, no one characteristic has to be present as long as all or even some of the others are present; but it cannot do without all of them. This might well be called the quorum feature of language.[11]

That is, while no one feature can stand on its own, so to speak, a certain quorum of features is necessary to provide adequate grounds for the use of a term. While it is difficult to set a minimum number of characteristics which must be exhibited, if none at all are present, the term clearly does not apply, and if all are present, the term clearly does apply. "The more of the X-ish characteristics there are, the more confidently we apply the term", says Hospers.[12]

Of course one can conceive of a case where some of the conditions are more relevant than others. Hospers takes account of this fact:

> Not all the characteristics carry the same weight. Some may count more heavily than others: thus A alone may count more heavily toward something being an X than B and C do together.[13]

As well, Hospers says that "some characteristics are not merely absent or present but present in varying degrees, and the higher the degree to which the characteristic is present, the more it gives weight to calling the thing in question an X."[14]

It is already possible to see how one might go about dealing with indoctrination in the way Hospers describes. But let us look at one more example of the way vague, or 'rough-edged' concepts can be dealt with.

William Alston's approach to the problem of vague concepts is not significantly different from Hospers'. The example he employs is that of the concept of 'religion'.

Alston first sets out nine criteria which characterize all the forms religion could take. If there is a case which satisfies all of these conditions, it is unquestionably a religion, says Alston.[15] However, he says, there are examples which we would want to call 'religions' which do not meet all the criteria. Alston therefore questions the necessity of these conditions:

> We can say then that the conjunction of these features provides a sufficient condition for the application of the term 'religion'. But is it also necessary? What happens if one or more of these features is absent, or present only in an attenuated form?[16]

Indeed, in many religions one or more the criteria he lists is not presented. The obvious conclusion is that one or more of these conditions is not necessary, or perhaps none of them is necessary. Alston does, in fact, find that each and every one of the conditions is expendable. But, says Alston, this does not render the situation hopeless:

> The important point is that with many combinations of these features we get uncertainty about and/or disputes over application of 'religion', even when all the 'facts' are agreed on. If we have all the features exemplified, we clearly have a religion; if none or almost none are exemplified, as with baseball, it is clearly not a religion.[17]

To summarize, Alston sets out all the criteria which he feels are important in delineating a religion. He finds that only a few religions can meet all these criteria. As there are many cases which we would call 'religion' which do not exhibit all of these characteristics, it follows, according to Alston, that these criteria are sufficient, but no one of these is necessary. We could now deal with the case as Hospers suggests. The more criteria exhibited, the more confidently we call the case in question a religion. The problematic cases in between would have to be decided by determining the relative weight of the different criteria and the degree to which they are present in the particular case. Let us now return to the problem of the concept of indoctrination.

Wittgenstein's approach has been used to analyze other concepts. It now remains to be seen whether or not

the type of analysis presented above can be used to analyze the concept of indoctrination.

It seems to me that what the philosophers in the first part of this thesis do, and do very well, is to show that 'indoctrination' is precisely the kind of concept that requires the type of analysis used by Wittgenstein, Hospers and Alston. In their attempt to delineate the conditions necessary and sufficient for indoctrination, Wilson, Hare, et al., provide us with many important characteristics which could possibly be viewed as sufficient conditions for indoctrination, while not defining characteristics of the concept. Some of the conditions are obviously more important than others, and this is reflected in the treatment given them by the authors. Some can be present to a greater or lesser degree, as Flew suggests about the use of unacceptable methods of teaching.

By employing a combination of Hospers and Alston and by drawing on the important features of indoctrination which were revealed in the first five chapters of this thesis, I will now analyze the concept of indoctrination according to what Hospers calls "the quorum feature of language".

What, first of all, are the important characteristics of indoctrination? Clearly, as we can see from the previous writers, the important characteristics of indoctrination center around aim, content, and method. There are weaker and stronger claims about each of the criteria. Flew, for

example, argues more strongly for the 'content' criterion than for the 'method' criterion, although he includes both in his analysis. For my purposes I will use only the stronger claims about each criterion in this analysis. The reason for this is simply that there are strong claims about each of the criterion each claim made by a different analyst. For example, White presents the strongest and the most extensive argument for the 'aim' criterion, while Hare's argument is considerably weaker and less sophisticated.

Regarding aim, then, an important characteristic of indoctrination is the intention on the part of the teacher that the students come to believe what is taught (a proposition, or set of propositions) unshakably. Snook alters this somewhat by replacing 'unshakably' with 'regardless of the evidence'. But the 'evidence' criterion, a part of the 'content' criterion, is taken care of by Green who considers that giving insufficient reasons and evidence for what is taught comprises a case of indoctrination. This, then, will be another important feature. Flew's argument for the 'doctrine' distinction cannot be ignored. While White argues that because of the intention of the indoctrinator anything can be indoctrinated, Flew's distinction does not rest on the intention of the indoctrinator. The teaching of doctrines as true which are either false or not known to be true is certainly a potentially important feature of indoctrination. The 'content' criterion has yet another facet. Wilson argues that the teaching of uncertain beliefs

as certain is a distinguishing characteristic of indoctrination. Since White shows that doctrine is not essential to indoctrination, and since not all beliefs are doctrinal beliefs, and further since the teaching of uncertain beliefs as certain can be seen to comprise a case of indoctrination in certain instances, I will include this criterion as one of the criteria for indoctrination.

The 'method' criterion is rather difficult to deal with since we are not always certain as to what 'improper', 'unacceptable', or 'illicit' means or methods of teaching might be. However, Flew and Moore show to my satisfaction that some cases of indoctrination do in fact rest solely on the 'method' criterion, and for this reason I include it as an important feature.

The following conditions would be characteristic of a case of indoctrination:

(1) The teaching or presentation of a proposition or set of propositions with the intention that the subject comes to hold the proposition or set of propositions unshakably.

(2) The teaching or presentation of subject matter without sufficient use of reasons or evidence.

(3) The teaching or presentation of doctrines as true, which are either false or not known to be true.

(4) The teaching or presentation of uncertain beliefs as certain.

(5) The teaching or presentation of subject matter through the use of unacceptable means or methods.

It must be pointed out that I intend this set of criteria to be open-ended; that is, other conditions may in the future possibly be shown to be relevant additions. It seems to me that there is another condition, the sixth condition, which also bears mention. This condition involves the 'end-state' of indoctrination. It also can be seen that this condition is necessary to all cases of successful indoctrination. For surely it must be seen that in every case of successful indoctrination there must be someone who has become indoctrinated; someone who exhibits the features of an indoctrinated person: closed-mindedness, and disregard for facts and evidence regarding his beliefs. However, the 'end-state' criterion is not a sufficient condition, for a person can display the characteristics of an indoctrinated subject, as in the case of someone who thinks he is Napoleon, but who must be seen rather as a paranoic, and not as one who has been indoctrinated.

Clearly, any case which met all of the criteria would be a case of indoctrination. Let me take the example of the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools as a possible case of indoctrination. Does it meet the conditions?

Regarding the first condition, there is no question that it is the express wish of the teachers of Roman Catholicism that their charges come to believe in what is taught, and that their belief be an unwavering belief.

The second criterion is rather more difficult to show than the first. There are many very scholarly teachers of Roman Catholicism, and in their presentation of the Roman Catholic doctrine they are capable of giving extensive reasons and evidence for what they are attempting to show. This is where Green's point regarding the giving of reasons and evidence comes in. Green says that the difference between an indoctrinator and educator is that the indoctinator presents reasons and evidence in order to establish his position, where the educator presents reasons and evidence in order to arrive at the truth regarding the matter in question. Now I have said regarding Green's analysis that it is not clear that every case of indoctrination would necessarily illustrate this point. That is, not every indoctrinator need do as Green says, nor does every teacher who attempts to prove a point indoctrinate. However, I would say that it is the intention of the teacher of Roman Catholic doctrine that his subjects believe the doctrine to be true, and there should be little objection to my saying that the teacher would stop giving reasons and evidence whenever the subject came to hold the belief or beliefs. In other words, the amount of reasons and evidence presented will be in accordance with the amount that is needed to convince the students of the doctrine. This is surely different from the educational use of reasons and evidence. I feel that the second condition is satisfied, if not in all instances, surely in many.

In the example I have chosen, i.e., the teaching of Roman Catholicism in Roman Catholic schools, it is possible to deal with the third and fourth conditions at the same time. The beliefs which are taught by the Church form a doctrine and thus what is said of the beliefs can be said of the doctrine. It should be obvious that the beliefs are in fact uncertain, but I will give some examples to prove my point. Catholic doctrine states that Jesus Christ was born of a virgin. The teachers of this doctrine have in the past, and do in the present teach this as a certain truth. Catholic doctrine states that every human being has a soul which is present from conception and which will live for all eternity. The teachers of this doctrine teach this as certain; as the truth. At least in the scientific sense, it must simply be admitted that this doctrine is dubious, that the tenets of this doctrine are uncertain, and that the tenets of the doctrine, and thus the doctrine itself is taught or presented as certain and true. The third and fourth conditions are met.

The fifth condition is the most difficult to relate to the teaching of Catholic doctrine in the school. One might find cases where rote learning is over-used, or where the method of using the catechism could be seen as objectionable, but these are very difficult charges to prove. For this reason I will say that it is entirely conceivable that illicit methods are used, but I will not say that my example will always meet this condition.

I conclude that the teaching of religion in the Roman Catholic school system is a clear case of indoctrination, although it does not fully meet all of the criteria. I am not sure that there is a case of indoctrination which meets fully all of the criteria. But such a case does not necessarily have to exist for us to understand what indoctrination is. The reason for this is related to what Hospers says, namely, "No one characteristic has to present as long as all or even some of the others are present." As well, he says, "Not all of the characteristics carry the same weight." So while the example I use does not fully meet the 'method' criterion, it does meet, and meet rather fully, the other four criteria. And again, as Hospers states, some characteristics "are not merely absent or present but present in varying degrees." My conclusion then, is based on this type of reasoning: The criteria met by my example carry more weight individually and collectively than the condition which is either only partially met, or is not met at all. Further, of the conditions which are met, it can be said that all are present to a great degree.

Some justification is necessary to establish the weight I give to certain conditions. Assuming for the moment that all the criteria are present to the same degree, there is little doubt in my mind that the condition of intention carries more weight individually than any of the other conditions do individually. I base this conclusion on the evidence given by White and Snook, not to mention Gregory

and Woods, which shows that intention is of singular importance in many instances of indoctrination. All else being equal, I feel there is little doubt that we would take issue more strongly with an avowed indoctrinator than we would with one who is indoctrinating unwittingly. Also, as White has shown, this criterion can in itself readily account for a case of indoctrination. I would rate conditions 2, 3 and 4 individually heavier than I would the fifth condition, that of method. This is because, as Wilson says, it is extremely difficult to differentiate the methods of an indoctrinator from the methods of a legitimate teacher.

Regarding the degree to which any of these conditions are met, I would say that any one of the conditions which is present to an extremely high degree would possibly qualify a case as a case of indoctrination. However, the use of objectionable methods would have to be significantly more obvious than the presence of the intention to indoctrinate. One might say that one could be justified in calling a case indoctrination if the first three conditions are met to a medium degree, or if all five of the conditions are met to a slight degree, but I will say as Hospers says about something being an X: The more of the conditions that are met, and the more of the conditions which carry the more weight that are met, and finally, to the greater degree that these conditions are met, the more I would want to call the case in question a case of indoctrination.

During the course of this thesis I have raised certain

questions about the general nature of indoctrination. With the analysis just concluded in mind, let us take a look at how well these questions can be answered.

The first question is of the teaching of small children; is this indoctrination, given that they are not capable of rational discourse? Since the only criterion met is the second, which deals with the teaching of subject matter without the use of sufficient reasons and evidence, and since as much evidence and as many reasons are given as the child can understand, this would not necessarily be a case of indoctrination.

Given that indoctrination is a bad practice, are there degrees of indoctrination? From my analysis, and given that serious cases of indoctrination (i.e., cases where most of the conditions are met to a great degree) are bad practices, it seems that, quite simply, the more one would want to call a case a case of indoctrination, the more we would object to it. Similarly, the less we would want to call a case one of indoctrination, the less we would object to it.

Must an indoctrinator be successful before we can say that he is indoctrinating? To answer this question completely would require an analysis similar to the analysis which some have done on the concept of teaching. However, it seems to me that the harder an indoctrinator tries to indoctrinate (or to do things unwittingly that we would want to call indoctrination) the more likely he is to meet more of the conditions and the more we would want to call

him an indoctrinator, and it seems to follow, the more likely he will succeed. Thus, the person we would most strongly want to label an indoctrinator is most likely to be successfully indoctrinating his students. It may also be possible that students become mildly indoctrinated as a result of a mild attempt to indoctrinate them.

How does one determine the intention of an indoctrinator? Given that the indoctrinator does not openly admit his intentions, one would try to ascertain them from the content taught, or from any one of the other criteria which caused us to question his motives in the first place, and for that matter, which are probably sufficient to call him an indoctrinator regardless of his intentions.

Can one indoctrinate without the intention to indoctrinate? Clearly, from the analysis, yes.

While it has been shown that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for indoctrination the 'end-state' condition can be seen to be necessary but not sufficient. In order to more fully understand what is meant by the term 'indoctrination', it is necessary to include the various other criteria discussed in this chapter.

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